Description
This Jira is responding to follow up work for HADOOP-14077. The original goal of HADOOP-14077 is to have ability to support multiple ACL lists. The original problem is a separation of duty use case where the Hadoop cluster hosting company monitors Hadoop cluster through jmx. Application logs and hdfs contents should not be visible to hosting company system administrators. When checking for proxy user authorization in AuthenticationFilter to ensure there is a way to authorize normal users and admin users using separate proxy users ACL lists. This was suggested in HADOOP-14060 to configure AuthenticationFilterWithProxyUser this way:
AuthenticationFilterWithProxyUser->StaticUserWebFilter->AuthenticationFIlterWithProxyUser
This enables the second AuthenticationFilterWithProxyUser validates both credentials claim by proxy user, and end user.
However, there is a side effect that unauthorized users are not properly rejected with 403 FORBIDDEN message if there is no other web filter configured to handle the required authorization work.
This JIRA is intend to discuss the work of HADOOP-14077 by either combine StaticUserWebFilter + second AuthenticationFilterWithProxyUser into a AuthorizationFilterWithProxyUser as a final filter to evict unauthorized user, or revert both HADOOP-14077 and HADOOP-13119 to eliminate the false positive in user authorization and impersonation.
Attachments
Issue Links
- duplicates
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YARN-7923 Refine proxy user authorization to support multiple ACL list
- Resolved
- supercedes
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HADOOP-14077 Improve the patch of HADOOP-13119
- Resolved
eyang - IMO, we need to revert both
HADOOP-14077andHADOOP-13119and then determine whether to address the original issue.Let's please be clear on what that problem is - can you verify whether the following summarizes it properly?
Due to the paradox created by the facts in 2 and 3 above we have the following situation, we need to decide whether we should either:
Personally, I don't believe that the fact that certain resources can't be accessed in deployments that only allow impersonation means that we should redefine the proxyuser enforcement strength.
I think that it is valid to consider strengthening the proxyuser enforcement to deny access to specific sensitive resources.
Whether or not certain resources are too sensitive for impersonation can be left up to the deployment.