[CASSANDRA-12322] Use of Dynamic Class Loading, Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code

• Type: Sub-task
• Status: Open
• Priority: Normal
• Resolution: Unresolved
• Component/s: Legacy/Core
• Assignee: Unassigned
• Reporter: Eduardo Aguinaga
• Created: 27/Jul/16 15:49
• Updated: 16/Apr/19 09:30

Description

Overview:
In May through June of 2016 a static analysis was performed on version 3.0.5 of the Cassandra source code. The analysis included an automated analysis using HP Fortify v4.21 SCA and a manual analysis utilizing SciTools Understand v4. The results of that analysis includes the issue below.

Issue:
Dynamically loaded code has the potential to be malicious. The application uses external input to select which classes or code to use, but it does not sufficiently prevent the input from selecting improper classes or code.

The snippet below shows the issue on lines 112-116 by instantiating a class by name.

FastByteOperations.java, lines 103-127:

103     static ByteOperations getBest()
104     {
105         String arch = System.getProperty("os.arch");
106         boolean unaligned = arch.equals("i386") || arch.equals("x86")
107                             || arch.equals("amd64") || arch.equals("x86_64") || arch.equals("s390x");
108         if (!unaligned)
109             return new PureJavaOperations();
110         try
111         {
112             Class<?> theClass = Class.forName(UNSAFE_COMPARER_NAME);
113 
114             // yes, UnsafeComparer does implement Comparer<byte[]>
115             @SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
116             ByteOperations comparer = (ByteOperations) theClass.getConstructor().newInstance();
117             return comparer;
118         }
119         catch (Throwable t)
120         {
121             JVMStabilityInspector.inspectThrowable(t);
122             // ensure we really catch *everything*
123             return new PureJavaOperations();
124         }
125     }
126 
127 }