Apache OpenOffice (AOO) Bugzilla – Full Text Issue Listing
|Summary:||Insecure permissions on temporary files at runtime|
|Status:||CLOSED FIXED||QA Contact:||issues <issues.openoffice.org>|
|Priority:||P2||CC:||chris, issues, maho.nakata, pavel, rasmuse, sparcmoz|
|Target Milestone:||OOo 1.1.3|
|Issue Type:||DEFECT||Latest Confirmation on:||---|
Description pmladek 2004-08-24 15:38:43 UTC
When OOo is started, a directory /tmp/sv<RAND>.tmp is created, where RAND is a 3 character random string. The permissions of this directory allow other users (depending on the user's umask) to 'cd' to this directory and list the contents. Once a file is saved, a zipped file is created in /tmp/sv<RAND>.tmp and the name of the file follows the same convention. The permissions of the file allow others (depending on the user's umask) to read the content. Due to this any user can grab sensitive information of someother user. Steps to reproduce the problem: 1. Launch OpenOffice. 2. List /tmp contents. Locate the directory 'sv*.tmp' 3. Type in some contents in the document and save it. 4. List the contents of the directory /tmp/sv*.tmp/ 5. Do not close OpenOffice. 'su' to a different user. 6. Copy the file under /tmp/sv*.tmp/ to home directory. 7. Use 'unzip' to unzip the files. 8. The file content.xml holds the data the user had just saved. The workaround is to set more secure umask. The problem is that the users does not know about it. Why should they need to set more strict umask if they save its data in a directory which has the correct permissions. They do not expect that there are any world-readable temporary data available somewhere on the system.
Comment 1 pavel 2004-08-24 17:09:21 UTC
raising prio, security/privacy issue.
Comment 2 thorsten.martens 2004-08-26 09:42:18 UTC
TM->MAV: Please have a look, thanks !
Comment 4 mikhail.voytenko 2004-08-31 16:06:44 UTC
MAV->MBA: sending to as discussed.
Comment 5 Mathias_Bauer 2004-09-02 15:39:21 UTC
Thanks for the patch, but we already had found the problem by ourselves and solved it in a slightly different way. We don't want to add exported functions to the sal library in a hurry, so we "hacked" the umask in unotools/source/ucbhelper/tempfile.cxx. This is ugly, but gives us some time to think about the desired osl-Interface that we will use in OOo2.0 then.
Comment 6 Mathias_Bauer 2004-09-29 11:19:59 UTC